Military Justice Without Military Control by Sherman, Edward F
Military Justice Without Military Control
Edward F. Sherman*
After World War II many western nations experienced popular dis-
satisfaction with their wartime military justice.1 The need for reexami.
nation was most critical in Germany whose World War II court-martial
system reflected both Prussian severity and Nazi arbitrariness.-" How-
ever, military justice in other western nations was also heavily discipli-
narian; and as a result of war-generated criticism, Western Germany,
Sweden, Austria, and Denmark abolished their court-martial systems. a
Other western nations, such as Great Britain, retained the court-martial,
but adopted more judicial procedures and expanded civilian control
over certain of its functions.4 However, American reforms were more
limited. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),5 enacted in
1950, extended a number of new procedural rights to servicemen, but
retained the traditional structure of the court-martial. The tri-tiered
hierarchy of commander-convened courts was left unchanged;0 and,
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1. For example, there were 1.7 million American courts-martial during World War
II with procedures which lacked such basic due process rights as legally-trained counsel
and judges, freedom from command influence, and appeal to a judicial tribunal. Sherman,
The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REV. 3, 3-28 (1970). When the war
ended there was such a public outcry that eighty-five percent of the sentences of the
27,500 servicemen still imprisoned were remitted or reduced. Farmer & Wels, Conmand
Control-Or Military Justice?, 24 N.Y.U. L.Q. 263, 265 (1949).
2. For an account of Nazi court-martial abuses, see R. GRUMBERGER, Tni- TWELVE-
YEAR REICH: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY, 1933-1945, at 161 (1971).
3. See INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF MILITARY LAW AND THE LAws OF WAR, TlE SAFE-
GUARD OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY LAW AND DISCIPLINARY
REGULATIONS (Ls GARANTIES DES DROITS INDIVIDUELs DANS LA REPRESSION DISCIPLINAIRE ET
PENALE MILITAIRE) 10, 46 (1966) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF MILITARY
LAw, THE SAFEGUARD OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS].
4. In addition to the nations discussed in this article, France, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Italy, Norway, and Canada all adopted reforms which
resulted in fairer courts-martial with expanded civilian court jurisdiction and review
powers. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF MILITARY LAW, THE SAFEGUARD OF INDIVIDUAL RIGiTS,
supra note 3, at 5-158.
5. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970). The UCMJ was amended by the Military Justice
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632 (Oct. 24, 1968).
6. There are three levels of court-martial: general, special, and summary. A general
court-martial may only be convened by high-level commanders. Art. 22, Uniform Code
of Military Justice [hereinafter cited as UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. § 822. It may prescribe any
punishment allowed for the offense by the Table of Maximum Punishments promulgated
by the President and contained in the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES (rev.
ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MCM 1969]. Art. 18, UCMJ. A special court-martial may
be convened by intermediate-level commanders, art. 23, UCMJ, and its maximum sen-
tence is six months' confinement at hard labor, six months' forfeiture of 2/3 pay,
demotion, and a bad conduct discharge. Art. 19, UCMJ. A summary court-martial may
be convened by lower-level commanders, art. 24, UCMJ, and its maximum punishment
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with the exception of the civilian Court of Military Appeals, all court-
martial functions were left to military men.7 Thus, the American court-
martial compares unfavorably with civilian courts which divide ju-
dicial functions among independent officials,8 and the Supreme Court
is one month's confinement at hard labor, forty-five days' confinement without hard
labor, and one month's forfeiture of 2/3 pay. Art. 20, UCMJ.
Procedures and rights differ with each type of court-martial. For example, the ac-
cused is guaranteed legally-trained counsel in a general and in a special court-martial
"unless counsel having such qualifications cannot be obtained on account of physical
conditions or military exigencies," art. 27(c)(1), UCMJ. but not in a summary court-
martial, which is essentially an administrative disciplinary proceeding in which the
commander acts as judge, jury, and counsel. However, after the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 US. 25 (1972), a federal court ruled that a service-
man could not be tried in a summary court-martial in which confinement could be
given unless represented by counsel. Daigle v. Warner, 348 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Hawaii
1972). The Army Judge Advocate General ordered that sentences of confinement be
prohibited in summary courts unless the accused were represented by lawyer counsel.
DAJA-MJ 1972/12338. Subsequently, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of California enjoined the Navy and Marine Corps from holding courts-martial any-
where in the world without lawyer defense counsel. Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1973, at 1,
col. 1. A verbatim transcript must be made in a general court-martial, but not in a
special (unless a bad conduct discharge is given) or a summary court-martial. Art.
54(a) & (b), UCMJ.
Commanders can also give disciplinary punishments by imposing non-judicial punish-
ment under Article 15(b), UCMJ. A field-grade officer (major or naval lieutenant, or
above) may impose correctional custody for up to thirty days, forfeiture of up to one-
half of one month's pay for two months, reduction in rank, restrictions, and extra
duties. An officer below field grade can impose correctional custody for up to sv'en
days, forfeiture of up to seven days' pay, reduction of one rank, restrictions, and extra
duties. A serviceman may, however, refuse non-judicial punishment and demand a
summary or special court-martial. MCM 1969, supra note 6, para. 132, at 26-8.
7. The commander can (1) bring court-martial charges against one of his men, arts.
22-24 UCMJ; (2) appoint an investigating officer and reject any recommendation by him
that the court-martial not be brought, art. 32, UCNfJ, MCM 1969, supra note 6, para. 34, at
7-9; (3) select the court members from his subordinates and the prosecutor and defense
counsel from the legal officers in his Staff Judge Advocate's office, arts. 25, 27, UCMJ; and
(4) reverse the conviction or reduce the sentence, art. 64, UCMJ. In addition, the com-
mander can (1) bargain with the accused in return for a guilty plea, see United States
v. Villa, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 42 C.M.R. 166 (1970); (2) grant immunity to accomplices
and witnesses in return for testimony favorable to the prosecution, MCM 1969, para.
150b, at 27-58-9; and (3) exercise general administrative control over the trial, such as
excusing court members before, and, in certain situations, even after the trial has begun,
see United States v. Allen, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 626, 18 C.M.R. 250 (1955). A commander, as
convening authority, is prohibited from censuring, reprimanding, or admonishing any
court member, judge, or counsel concerning the findings or sentence or from attempting,
by unlawful means, to influence the action of a court-martial or member. Art. 37,
UCMJ. But there has never been a prosecution under Article 37 despite a number of
cases claiming command influence. See note 8 infra.
All court-martial functions are performed by servicemen unless the accused hires his
own civilian attorney. Military judges, required in a general court-martial and detailed
in a special court-martial if the convening authority determines the case is sufficiently
complex, are officers under a separate judicial command from that of the commander.
Although civilian employees of the service can be appointed to the courts of military
appeals, there is now but one civilian who is on the Naval Court of Military Review%.
The highest military court, the Court of Military Appeals, which hears only about two
hundred discretionary appeals a year, provides the only civilian forum in the entire
system.
8. For example, the Court of Military Appeals reversed ninety-three court-martial
convictions from Ft. Leonard Wood because of the possibility of command influence.
United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967). A partial list of in-
dividual accounts and cases charging command influence in the Vietnam War period
is contained in Sherman, Congressional Proposals for Reform of Military Law, 10 AM.
Cm m. L. REv. 25, 40 n.82 (1971). For a discussion of Court of Military Appeals decisions
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has repeatedly cut back on military jurisdiction on the grounds that the
court-martial provides an inferior forum for the protection of constitu-
tional rights. 9
Today, more than twenty-one years after the UCMJ took effect, issues
of command control and the civilianization of military justice are still
very much alive. Legislative reforms have been proposed, ranging from
decreasing court-martial jurisdiction and limiting commander control
through an independent military judiciary ° to the complete abolition
of the court-martial for offenses committed within the United States."1
Especially relevant to the American debate on military justice is the
experience of European countries which have either civilianized or
abolished their court-martial systems. This article will evaluate three
of the principal systems of civilianized military justice and will indicate
to what degree greater or complete civilianization of the court-martial
is a feasible alternative to the present American military justice system.
I. Theoretical Justifications for a Separate System of Military Justice
Military justice developed as a separate legal system under com-
mand control because military units were often isolated from both civil-
ians and each other. Commanders needed the power to convene a court-
martial staffed with their own officers so that a quick determination of
guilt could be made. However, modern transportation and communi-
cation have ended the isolation of military units, and trial of service-
men in civilian courts is now feasible in most situations.
Nevertheless, for several reasons, the military still maintains that a
dealing with command influence, see Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.,
780-81 (1962). See also 'Vest, A History of Command Influence on the Military Judicial
System, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1970).
9. The UCMJ purported to establish a total criminal law system applicable to all
military and civilian offenses committed by a serviceman at any place or under any
circumstances. This proposition was rejected by the Supreme Court in United States
ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), holding court-martial jurisdiction can.
not be extended to non-"service-connected" offenses of servicemen because of the ab.
sence of a number of basic constitutional rights in courts-martial. The Court has also
declared unconstitutional court-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by civilians
such as discharged servicemen, dependents overseas in peacetime, and civilian employees
of the military not in the field. See McElroy v. United States ex tel. Guargllardo, 361
U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rcl.
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 1l (1955).
10. Over the past three years bills have been introduced by Senators Bayh, S. 1127,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); Hatfield, S. 4168-4178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); and Ervin,
S. 1266, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); and Congressman Bennett, H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971), and H.R. 291, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which would, inter alia, abolish
court-martial jurisdiction over a number of military and civilian offenses and transfer
commanders' control over courts-martial to an independent military judiciary command
under the Judge Advocate General.
11. The Congressional Black Caucus Report, Racism in the Military: A New System for
Rewards and Punishment, 118 CONG. REc. E 8674-8688 (Oct. 14, 1972).
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separate system of justice free from civilian control is essential to effi-
ciency and discipline. First, it is argued that "civilian courts cannot
react to the needs of the service."'12 The fear that the military would be
hampered by civilian courts may have been justified when military
camps were frequently impermanent and when civilian officials antag-
onistic to the military13 could not always be relied upon for a fair or
efficient trial. But today it seems clear that civilian courts can dispose
of charges against servicemen as quickly and efficiently as courts-mar-
tial. A relatively easy augmentation of judicial personnel and facilities
should enable certain civilian courts near military installations to han-
dle the additional load of military cases. Even in overseas combat zones
servicemen can normally be transported to other locations for trial.
During the early part of the Vietnam War, for example, servicemen
were flown to Japan for general courts-martial, and a number of Viet-
nam cases, including the My Lai massacre, were tried in the United
States.
Second, it is argued that the military is a society apart from civilian
life which requires different legal standards the civilian courts cannot
appreciate or adequately enforce.14 However, today when most service-
men perform technical jobs, 1' large numbers of them live off-base,'0
and the armed forces are moving toward a greater degree of individu-
ality and privacy for their members, 7 the distinctiveness of military
life is questionable at best. Sociologists have noted the gradual conver-
gence of military and civilian social structures due to technology and
the bureaucratization of military functions.18 Many jobs in civilian life
12. Senior Officer's Legal Orientation, Criminal Law, part B, at 8 (Judge Advocate
General's School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1971). See also H. MoyEn,
JUSTIcE AND THE MILITARY 11-19 (1972).
13. For accounts of dashes between troops and townspeople, see Hearings on S. 5320
Before the Senate Comm. on Military Affairs, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 39-42 (1919); J. IEVwER,
THE BROWNSVILLE RAm (1971).
14. See Westmoreland, Mfilitary Justice-A Commander's Viewpoint, 10 An. Clai.
L. RFv. 5, 7 (1971); INTERNATIONAL SOCIErY OF MILITARY LAW, Tim SAtFEGuARD OF INDI-
viDuAL Rsnrs, supra note 3, at 137.
15. Fifty-four percent of American enlisted men perform technical specialties such as
electronics and mechanics, and thirty-two percent have service specialties, e.g., food.
administration, clerical. J. SHELBuRNE & K. GROvES, EDUCATION IN TIE AnMED FORCES
37 (1965).
16. In a number of European armed forces, servicemen in many jobs live at home
or away from the military installation. In the American military, servicemen who have
completed basic training may be permitted by their commanding officer to live off-
post in the United States and abroad.
17. See, e.g., The New Army: A Ft. Benning Brigade of Volunteers Indicates Nixon
Plan Will Work, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1972, at 1, col. 1; Humanizing the U.S. Military,
TimE, Dec. 21, 1970, at 16.
18. See M. JANowrrz, TE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER (1954): Tie NEw MN~tAR (M.
Janowitz ed. 1967); Biderman & Sharp, The Convergence of Military and Ciilian Oc-
cupational Structures, 73 Ams. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 381 (1968). But see Moskos, The New
Estrangement: Armed Forces and American Society, m PUnLIC OPL'aoN AND TuEE MILI-
TARY ESTABLISHUENT (C. Moskos ed. 1971).
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-such as police and fire department work-are analogous to the mili-
tary in their need for precise execution of duties during occasionally
dangerous missions; yet such departments are governed by civilian legal
standards. Similarly, while the military does have certain unique of-
fenses,"0 such as AWOL, desertion, and insubordination, civilian courts
should be able to balance the peculiar competing policies in military
cases just as they do in other legal specialties such as juvenile or
regulatory agency law.
Third, because military justice has traditionally been viewed as
partly judicial and partly disciplinary,20 the court-martial is said to be
essential for the enforcement of command discipline. 21 However, recent
changes in the armed forces dispute the necessity or even desirability
of using the court-martial primarily as a vehicle for the enforcement of
discipline. Military leadership doctrine now favors persuasion over au-
thoritarian domination and views the commander's objective as instill-
ing high initiative and morale rather than rigid discipline.22 Moreover,
non-judicial punishment powers presently permit commanders to en-
force discipline by imposing a variety of effective but less serious pun-
ishments than those given by a court-martial. 23 Finally, the move of
most western armed forces toward civilian court procedures and poli-
cies which limit command influence on courts-martial indicates the
growing acceptance of the court-martial as an impartial judicial pro-
ceeding rather than a disciplinary mechanism. 24
Thus, the traditional theoretical arguments do not justify separate
military justice systems free from civilian control. However, whether
civilianization or abolition of courts-martial is workable in practice
19. However, substantive military law incorporates most civilian legal offenses. See,
e.g., Articles 118-31 of the UCMJ, containing civilian felonies such as murder, rape,
larceny, assault, and perjury. Moreover, Article 134 of the UCMJ, referring to "crimes
and offenses not capital," has been interpreted as incorporating by reference all non-
capital federal crimes. MCM 1969, supra note 6, para. 213, at 28-71.
20. U.S. Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps, The Military Justice Systen,
in H. MOYER, supra note 12, at 17-18; Westmoreland, supra note 14, at 6, 8.
21. For example, General Eisenhower argued, "Division of command responsibility
and the responsibility for the adjudication of offenses and of accused offenders cannot
be as separate as it is in our own democratic government." Quoted in Letter from New
York State Bar Association to Committee on Military Justice, Jan. 29, 1949, at 5, In
VI Morgan Papers, Harvard Law School Library.
22. See, e.g., Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and the United States
Military Academy, PROCEEDINGS FOR THE JUNIOR OFFICER L4DADERSIIIP WoRKsHOP ON CON-
TEMPORARY PROBLEMS (1972); M. JANOWrTZ, TnE MILITARY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEw
NATIONS 119-20 (1964).
23. After Congress amended Article 15 of the UCMJ in 1962 to expand the non-
judicial punishment powers of officers, there was an immediate increase in the Use of
non-judicial punishments. See Miller, A Long Look at Article 15, 28 MIL. L. REv. 37 (1965).
24. See INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF MILITARY LAw, THE SAFEGUARD OF INDIVIDUAL RIGITS,
supra note 3, at 19.
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and feasible in the American armed forces is a further question the
experience of western European nations may help to answer.
II. British Reforms Through the Separation and Civilianization
of Court Martial Functions
In 1946 a special committee appointed by the British War Office2
recommended dramatic changes for the separation of functions in army
and air force courts-martial.20 These reforms were implemented by (1)
the extension in 1947 of the legal aid program for representing service-
men in courts-martial by civilian lawyers, 27 (2) the establishment in
1948 of an independent military prosecutorial agency along with a sepa-
rate civilian organization to provide judicial officers for courts-mar-




Prosecutions are conducted by military lawyers in the Directorates of
Army and Air Force Legal Services.3" When a commanding officer
files charges against a serviceman, he determines if the case should be
disposed of by court-martial; if so, a Directorate lawyer is assigned to
provide pre-trial advice, help frame the charges, and prosecute the
case.3 ' An accused serviceman can hire his own lawyer, or request the
25. REPORT OF THE A ty" AN Am FORCE CouRS-ARTUL CoUIrssrr 1946, Csm. No.
7608 (1946).
26. The recommendations did not affect the hierarchical structure of the court-
martial system, retaining the three types of courts-martial: general, field.general. and
district, convened by commanders at different echelons and carrying different maximum
punishments.
27. Army Council Instruc. 603, July 19, 1947; Air Force Ministry Order A716, Sept.
4, 1947.
28. The Committee's recommendation, adopted by the Government, was implemented
by Army Council Instruc. 880 (1948) and Air Ministry Order A798 (1948). F. WIrRn,
CIVILIANS UNDER MiLiTARY JUsTICE 231 n.l1 (1967). The provisions arc contained in 33
Halsbury's Laws of England §§ 1819 et seq.; Queen's Regulations for the Army, 1955.
para. 219.
29. Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c.46; 33 Halsbury's Laws of
England §§ 1847-66.
30. The Directorates are composed of some sixty barristers and solicitors who are
military officers serving at bases at home and abroad in a separate chain of command
from the Minister of Defense through the Under-Secretary of State, the Adjutant Gen-
eral of the Army or the Air Member for Personnel, to the Directors of Army and Air
Force Legal Services. In describing the British court-martial system, the author relies
in part on interviews in London in July 1971 with various British officials engaged in the
administration of courts-martial, including Brian A. Duncan, QC, the Judge Advocate
General; Vernon Harington, Assistant Judge Advocate General; Brigadier D. S. Appleby,
Directorate of Army Legal Services; D. A. Smart, Clerk of the Court of Appeals, Courts-
Martial Division, and upon later correspondence with Major D.H.D. Selwood, Direc-
torate of Army Legal Services, and F. H. Dean, QC, the Judge Advocate General since
July 1972.
31. I THE MiNiSTRY OF DEFENSE MANUAL or MILITARY Lpa, ch. 11, para. 14, at 11
[hereinafter cited as MANUAL or MiLrrARa LAW].
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appointment of one through the legal aid program, provided he meets
the minimum income and wealth tests.3 2 In a district court-martial, if
the accused does not hire a lawyer, and if the Director of Legal Services
determines that an appointed lawyer is unnecessary because the issues
are not complex, a non-lawyer military "defending officer" will be
appointed.
Courts-martial are presided over by members of the Judge Advocate
General's office, an independent civilian agency despite its retention
of the traditional military title. The Office is composed of the civilian
Judge Advocate General and some twenty judicial officers or "judge
advocates," all of whom must be barristers with prior legal or judicial
experience. On appointment by the Crown these judge advocates are
given a full orientation on military structure, history, and traditions.
A judge advocate is appointed for every general court-martial and for
district courts-martial when a legally-trained presiding official is
deemed necessary. In 1972, twenty-eight percent of the courts-martial
had a judge advocate. 3 The judge advocate controls the conduct of the
trial, ruling on procedural motions, the admissibility of evidence, and
motions that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case.
He also gives a summation to the court at the trial's end. However, he
is not a full judge, and it is the officers on the court who are the sole
judge on questions of law, fact, and sentence.
Judge advocates assigned to the Judge Advocate General (JAG) office
in London normally officiate at courts-martial held in the British Isles.
They are also located abroad where sizable numbers of British troops
are stationed: Germany, Cyprus, Hong Kong, and, until recently, Singa-
pore. Where there is no resident judge advocate, such as in Gibraltar
and the West Indies, one is generally sent from the London office.34
Judge advocates abroad may receive housing and other services from
the local military commander, but they are otherwise independent of
all military control.
B. Appeals
In addition to separating court-martial functions at trial, the Brit-
ish also civilianized military appellate functions. Following a trial, the
32. If a serviceman meets the minimum income and wealth tests for eligibility for
legal aid, he may choose a lawyer or select one from lists made available to the Direc-
torates of Legal Services by the Bar Council (for barristers) and the Law Society (for
solicitors) containing the names of lawyers experienced in military law.
33. Statistics provided by the Office of the Judge Advocate General.
34. Similarly, if a serviceman is tried abroad at a place where a British lawyer
who can serve as defense counsel is not available, a lawyer, either from Great Britain
or a nearby British colony, may be brought in at government expense.
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convening commander consults with the JAG office on whether the
charges were proper, the evidence sufficient, and the sentence legal.35
The commander (referred to as the "confirming authority") need not
follow such advice, but in practice normally does, for he has to, as a
matter of law, justify disregarding it.3 If the conviction is confirmed
by the commander, it is forwarded to a higher "reviewing authority."
Acting with or without legal advice, this officer may set aside the con-
viction, reduce the sentence, or take any action the confirming author-
ity could have taken. If again affirmed, the papers are sent to the JAG
office for yet another review.
After these administrative reviews have been completed, the accused
may submit an "appeal petition" to the Army or Air Force Board,
which is composed of certain political officers (such as the Secretary of
State for Defense), high-ranking civil servants, and military officers.37
The Judge Advocate General advises the Board on how to dispose of
the petition, and again the Board may set aside the conviction, reduce
the sentence, or take any action which the confirming officer could
have taken. If the accused is still not satisfied, he may petition for an
appeal to the Courts-Martial Appeal Court. This court is composed of
three civilian judges assigned from the judges of the Court of Appeal
and the Queen's Bench of the High Court of Justice. The Lord Chief
Justice or one of the Lord Justices of the Court of Appeal is usually
presiding officer. The court must grant leave to appeal before a case
can be heard. It reviews questions of fact and law, but cannot grant a
new trial or revise court-martial sentences. It can, however, indicate
displeasure at unduly harsh sentences, and this may result in a reduc-
tion of sentence by the service Board.38 The case load is extremely light;
from 1966 through 1972, there were only fifty-seven requests for ap-
peal, thirteen of which were heard by the court.30 The right to counsel
continues through the submission of the request for appeal, and the
court has authority to grant legal aid for the appeal itself.
C. Jurisdiction
The Army Act of 1955 extended court-martial jurisdiction over
members of the military for all offenses committed overseas and for all
35. Queen's Regulations for the Army, 1955, para. 819. Advice need not be sought
after a district court-martial unless the commander is in doubt.
56. Karlen, Court-Martial Appeals in England, 20 Mf. L. REV. 65 (1963).
37. Rules of Procedure (Army) 1956, R. 101.
38. Karlen, supra note 86, at 74.
39. 'Statistics provided by Directorate of Army Legal Services. Following the court's
decision, there is a possibility of a further appeal to the House of Lords. Since thejudges will only certify to the House of Lords a legal point of general public im-
portance, such appeals are extremely rare: only one in the first ten years of the court.
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offenses committed in the United Kingdom, except murder, man-
slaughter, treason, and rape. 40 However, the Queen's Regulations pro-
vide that "an offense, whether committed on Ministry of Defense
premises or not, which affects the person or property of a civilian
should normally be dealt with by a civil court," though "an offense
which involved only service personnel, their property or service prop-
erty should normally be dealt with by the military authorities." 41 Thus,




In the over twenty years since the adoption of these reforms, Britain
has maintained a substantial number of troops abroad and has been
involved in a number of limited wars and military operations without
experiencing serious administrative difficulties in the conduct of its
courts-martial. There is no apparent movement in the army or air force
hierarchy for a return to the old system, and consideration has recently
been given to changing the naval code of justice to render it closer to the
army and air force. However, commanding officers can still decide what
charges will be preferred, whether a court-martial will be convened,
and who will serve as members of the court, 43 and these powers may
40. Army Act 1955, § 70(4); O'Connell, The Nature of British Military Law, 19 MIL.
L. REv. 141, 151 (1963).
41. Queen's Regulations for the Army, 1955, para. 734; MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW,
supra note 31, ch. VII, para. 4, at 167.
42. By contrast, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals has found sufficient "servlcc-
connection" as required by United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258
(1969), see note 9 supra, for court-martial jurisdiction over various offenses committcd
off-post involving: (1) possession of drugs, United States v. Rose, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 41
C.M.R. 3 (1969); United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969);
but see United States v. Morley, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 179, 43 C.M.R. 19 (1970); (2) use of
military rank or status in committing offense, United States v. Haagenson, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
332, 41 C.M.R. 332 (1970); United States v. Fryman, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 71, 41 C.M.R. 71(1969); United States v. Morrisseau, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 17, 41 C.M.R. 17 (1969); (3) offenses
peretrated against other servicemen, United States v. Lovejoy, 20 UL 18, 42
C.?M.R. 210 (1970); United States v. Rego, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 9, 41 C.M.R. 9 (1969); but see
United States v. Wills, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 8, 42 C.M.R. 200 (1970); and (4) offenses coin-
mitted in foreign countries not cognizable in civilian courts, United States v, Ortiz, 20
U.S.C.M.A. 21, 42 C.M.R. 213 (1970); United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R.
64 (1969). However, American courts have not uniformly accepted the Court of Military
Appeals' liberal interpretation of court-martial jurisdiction since O'Callahan. See Moylan
v. Laird, 305 F. Supp. 551 (D.R.I. 1969); Flemings v. Chafee, 458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted sub nor. Warner v. Flemings, 408 U.S. 919 (1972). Contra, Mercer v.
Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 41 C.M.R. 264 (1970).
43. The commander or convening authority appoints the members of the court
who are required to be officers, coming when possible from a different unit (In the
case of a district court-martial) or corps (in the case of a general court-martial). A
general court-martial consists of a president of the rank of field officer and not less
than four other officers above the rank of captain. A district court-martial consists of
a president (normally a major or above) and at least two other officers, each of whom
has held a commission for at least two years. See 33 Halsbury's Laws of England, §§
1820-24. Thus, the rank and length of service requirements for court members Insure
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limit the civilianizing effects of the reforms and account in part for the
lack of criticism by commanders. On the other hand, court-martial sta-
tistics since the introduction of the reforms indicate decreased use of
the court-martial, and increased reliance on non-judicial punishment.4'
This trend reduces the need for expensive and time-consuming courts-
martial while saving minor offenders from the potentially higher sen-
tence and social stigma of a court-martial conviction. 45
While it is more difficult to assess the impact of the reforms on dis-
cipline and efficiency in the British armed forces, the British record
for order and discipline clearly compares favorably with other western
armed forces.40 With about ten percent of the British army having been
engaged for years in the difficult peace-keeping operation in Northern
Ireland, the English can claim with some justification, that "no other
army, faced with the riots and gunmen of Ulster, would have kept its
temper so well."47 Of course, other military reforms, including the
better pay, improved living conditions, and greater individual freedom
provided to attract volunteers when Britain adopted a volunteer force
in 1963, have undoubtedly contributed to this record. But while Brit-
ain has been plagued by some of the same personnel problems which
have confronted other western nations in recent years, e.g., a lack of
enthusiasm for military service and dissatisfaction with routine military
jobs,4 8 the court-martial reforms appear to have improved the quality
of British military justice without impairing discipline or efficiency.
that control of the function of determining guilt or innocence will be in ranking officers.
By contrast, the UCMJ provides that, upon request of an enlisted accused, at least
one-third of the court members must be enlisted men. However, commander or con-
vening authorities have generally selected high ranking NCO's who are considered to be
more disciplinarian and prosecution-minded than junior officers, and the election to
have one-third enlisted men is only made in about two percent of court-martial cases.
See Remcho, Military Juries: Constitutional Analysis and the Need for Reform, 47
IND. L.J. 193, 194-97 (1972).
44. In 1972, only four percent of the 1,969 courts-martial involved general courts.
Statistics provided by the Office of the Judge Advocate General. The British court-
martial rate is quite low, about 2,000 out of an army and air force active duty force
of 313,000 in 1969-1970, TE AfuMrrARa BALANCE 1969-1970. at 19 (International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies, London) or about 6.4 per 1,000. By contrast, there were
109,355 courts-martial in the American armed forces in 1969-70, with an active duty
force of 3,460,162, or a rate of 31.56 per 1000. Statistics provided by Department of
Defense.
45. For a discussion of the impact of court-martial convictions and less-than-honorable
discharges on veterans in later life, see Joint Hearings Before the Subcommn. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary and a Special Subcomnm. of the Comm.
on Armed Services on S. 745-62, S. 2906-7, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 833-34 (196 [hereinafter
cited as Joint Hearings]; 115 CoNG. Rac. 136 (1969) (Remarks of Senator Ervin); Fairbanks,
Disciplinary Discharges Restricting the Commander's Discretion, 22 HAs. sGS L.-. 291(1971). See generally Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Convic-
tion, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929 (1970).
46. See Lee, Britain's Professionals, ARsrv, July 1971, at 28.
47. Id. at 30.
48. Great Britain has had some difficulty in obtaining sufficient numbers of recruits
since it abolished the draft in 1963, despite increased pay, relaxation of discipline, and
improved working conditions. The number of recruits fell from 40,000 in 1966-67 to
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III. West German Reforms Through Abolition of Courts-Martial
and Creation of Civilian Service Courts
Following the bitterness of World War II, most West Germans felt
that the court-martial had helped foster Nazi authoritarianism and that
military justice reform was essential to achieve the goal of a democratic
army of "citizens in uniform" (Staatsburger in Uniform).49 Pursuant
to a 1954 amendment to the West German Constitution permitting the
reestablishment of the armed forces, 50 the West German Parliament in
1956 enacted the Soldiers Act (Soldatengesetz), which provides that
servicemen have the same rights and duties as other citizens, subject
only to specified restrictions justified by military necessity."' The Act
also provided for "soldiers' representatives" in each unit who consult
with the commander regarding certain disciplinary matters.5 2 In 1957,
the Military Disciplinary Regulations (Wehrdisziplinarordnung) estab-
lished limited disciplinary powers in commanders and in newly created
service courts.5 3 At about the same time, the Military Penal Code
(Wehrstrafgesetz) was enacted, making the usual military offenses
crimes triable in civilian courts.54 Finally, also in 1957, the office
32,000 in 1967-68 and 28,000 in 1968-69. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1971, at 12, col. 3. How-
ever, enlistments improved with 34,000 recruits in 1969-70. The drop in enlistments was
attributed by Ministry of Defense officials to the "inactivity" of British forces, resulting
from the pullback of forces from some parts of the old British empire. While there
was an emergency in Cyprus, jungle fighting in Malaya, or a crisis at Suez, the army
had the appeal of an active force. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1960, at 8, col. 4.
49. The concept of the new German army resulted in part from a group of former
Wehrmacht officers known as the Dienststelle Blank after its head Theodore Blank,
appointed by Conrad Adenhauer to report on proposals for German rearmament. In-
cluded were former General Count Gerhard von Schwerin, Colonel Wolf von Baudissin,
General Hans Speidel, and General Adolph Heusinger, and its report reflected Ban-
dissin's concept of a democratic military with appropriate structures and training which
would insure conformity to democratic ideals. See D. GENSCHE.L, WEIIRREFORM UND
REAKTION: DIE VORBEREITUNG DER INNEREN FUEHRUNG 1951-1956 (1972); Forstmeier, The
Image of the German Officer, 64 ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTION J. 52 (1969).
50. GRUNDGESETz FuER DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, art. 73, translated in A. PrAs-
LEE, 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 361-98 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BASIC LAW].
51. Gesetz iiber die Rechtsstellung der Soldaten (Soldatengesetz), Vom 19. Miirz 1956
(BGBI. I S. 114). Section 15 establishes the right of servicemen to participate while off-
duty in political activities, such as holding public office, but not including wearing the
uniform to political meetings or distributing political and propaganda materials in bar-
racks. Section 10 states that orders can be given, and need only be obeyed, if related to
official purposes and not violative of human dignity. The right of a serviceman to de-
velop his personality is also guaranteed and has been applied to permit the wearing
of civilian clothes off-duty, and the expression of opinions and criticisms, even of the
military and commanders. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, WHITE PAPER 1970 ON TIlE SI!-
CURrrY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND ON THE STATE OF TIlE GERMAN FEDERAL
ARMED FORCES 122 [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, NVIIITE PAPER].
52. Procedures for election of representatives were established in the Soldiers Rep-
resentatives Election and Term Act of 1957 (Vertrauensmiinnerwahlgesetz, Vom 26. Jul
1957 (BGBl. I 1052)). Military Disciplinary Regulations (Vorgesetztenverordnung, Yot
23. Dezember 1956 (BGB1. I 1966)), adopted in 1956 also placed distinct limitations upon
the powers of military superiors.
53. Wehrdisziplinarordnung, Vom 15. Mirz 1957 (BGBI. I 189), pursuant to BASIC
LAW, supra note 50, art. 96a(4).
54. Wehrstrafgesetz, Vorn 30 Miirz 1957 (BGBI. I 298), Vom 1 September 1969 (BGB1.
I 1502).
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of the Parliamentary Military Commissioner (Wehrbeauftragte des
Deutschen Bundestages) was established to enhance parliamentary con-
trol over the armed forces and to serve as an ombudsman to protect
servicemen's rights. 5
A. Abolition of Courts-Martial
West German servicemen are subject to both the civilian Penal Code
(Strafgesetzbuch) and the Military Penal Code (Vehrstrafgesetz) which
contains solely military offenses such as mutiny, desertion, AWOL,
mistreatment of subordinates, and abuse of command and disciplinary
powers. -5 Since there are no courts-martial, servicemen are tried for
offenses under either code in the appropriate civilian court. When a
commanding officer determines, pursuant to guidelines in regulations,
that an offense is sufficiently serious, he refers the military or civilian
case to the local civilian prosecutor. Such referral does not prevent the
commander from taking disciplinary action against the offender, but
disciplinary action is usually postponed until completion of the crimi-
nal proceedings. 57
The offenses in the Military Penal Code generally permit sentences
of a fine, confinement, or both, although Parliament has abolished con-
finement for a number of less serious offenses. Servicemen may be
sentenced to "disciplinary arrest" (generally involving confinement
during only the evening), and those under twenty-one may be sen-
tenced to the even less onerous "juvenile arrest." Judges have, in fact,
tended to impose fines, rather than confinement, for servicemen.
B. Disciplinary Powers in Commanders
Under the Military Disciplinary Regulations a company commander
may give disciplinary punishments for minor offenses,5 8 including a
55. Basic LAx, supra note 50, art. 45b; Gesetzilberden Welarbeauflragten, Vom 26.
Juni 1957 (BGBI. I 652). See also Wehrbeschwerdeordnung (Regulations governing com-
plaints), Vom 23 Dezember 1956 (BGBI. I 1006). There are three principal channels
for complaints by a serviceman: his superior officer, directly to the Minister of Defense;
or to the Parliamentary Commissioner. See also N.Y. Times. Apr. 29, 1969. at 2, col. 4.
The Commissioner dealt with 62,500 complaints from 1958 to 1970. 2.1 percent regarding
violations of basic rights, 21 percent infringements of leadership, 13 percent penal or dis-
ciplinary matters, and 61 percent social problems. FEMERAL MINts'Rv oF DEFENsF, WHrm
PAPER, supra note 51, at 123.
56. Wehrstrafgesetz, supra note 54, at paras. 30-41.
57. Wehrdisziplinarordnun, supra note 53, § 8. Since 1972, double punishment un-
der both civilian proceedings and discipline is only permitted in cases of grave breaches
of military order.
58. In describing the West German system of disposition of charges against service-
men, the author relies in part on interviews in August 1971 with German officials, in-
cluding Dr. Hans-Gfinter Schwenck, Ministerialrat, and later correspondence with Herr
Peter Zimmerman, Oberregierungsrat, and Dr. Dietrich Genschel, Oberstleutnant, Bun-
derministerium der Verteidigung.
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reprimand, fine of up to one month's pay, imposition of a curfew from
one day to three weeks, minor restrictions, and seven days' disciplinary
arrest. Batallion and higher commanders may, in addition to the com-
pany commander's sanctions, impose disciplinary arrest for up to
twenty-one days.
A commander imposes disciplinary punishment by informing the
accused of the charge, giving him and his soldiers' representative an
opportunity to be heard, and then imposing the punishment after at
least one night has passed since he learned of the case. Punishment is
stayed until any appeal has been completed. The only appeal available
from a punishment not involving disciplinary arrest is to the next
higher commander. Punishment involving disciplinary arrest, on the
other hand, must be approved by a judge of a service court (Truppen-
dienstgericht).59 If the judge approves the punishment, the serviceman
may then appeal to the full service court.
The service courts are civilian courts created to hear certain military
cases and appeals, much as other administrative courts in West Ger-
many deal with specialized areas such as labor, civil service, welfare,
or finance. There are presently six service court districts with twenty-
six judges who are civilian lawyers trained for civil judicial positions
and appointed for life by the Minister of Justice. Service court proceed-
ings are held in a courtroom generally located in a civilian community
near a military installation.
Procedure in service courts is similar to that found in other German
courts. The commander's legal advisor (Rechtsberater) is the prosecu-
tor.y0 The accused may hire his own civilian attorney, or a state legal
aid lawyer may be appointed to represent him. However, in many ap-
peals from disciplinary punishment, the serviceman is not represented
by a lawyer, unless the service judge decides the case is sufficiently com-
plicated. The relatively nonadversarial nature of German judicial pro-
ceedings often decreases the need for legal counsel. If the judge decides
a lawyer is not necessary, he will appoint a commissioned officer to
represent the accused. The court has a jury of sorts, composed of the
judge and two "assessors," one from the same rank group as the ac-
cused,01 the other a staff officer. Each of the assessors and the judge has
59. When a service judge is not available on a ship, a commanding officer may ex-
ecute a sentence of confinement, but, upon docking, must refer the case to a servicejudge for review.
60. There are presently ninety-four full-time legal advisors to commanders, all ci-
vilian civil-service attorneys. Kreuger-Sprengel, The German Military Legal System, 57
MIL. L. REv. 17, 25 (1972).
61. There are three rank groups: enlisted men, noncommissioned officers, and officers.
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one vote, and a majority determines the verdict. At the beginning of
each year assessors are selected at random from lists supplied by the
commander.
A serviceman who is dissatisfied with the decision of the service court
may appeal to the Service Senate (Wehrdienstsenate) if the court cer-
tifies the case for appeal. This is normally granted when the judge feels
the case is legally complicated or precedent-making. There are two
Service Senates composed of three federal judges (Bundesrichter) and
two military assessors (one a staff officer, one from the same rank-group
as the accused). Their composition reflects a conscious attempt to per-
mit the military some role, but not a dominant position, in the ultimate
appeal from disciplinary punishments.
C. Career Disciplinary Punishments
Either in place of, or in addition to, imposing simple disciplinary
punishment and referring the case to the civilian prosecutor, a com-
mander at or above the division level may seek career disciplinary
punishment (Laufbahnstrafen) against a career serviceman by filing
charges in the service court. In such a case the service court functions
as a trial court. The court can impose forfeiture of pay, delay of pro-
motion, reduction in grade, and dishonorable discharge. Such career
punishment provides an appropriate punishment for a career service-
man along with due consideration of the impact of the offense on his
career potential. Career punishment may be appealed to the Service
Senate under the same circumstances as regular disciplinary punish-
ment.
D. Military Courts in Time of War or National Emergency
The West German Constitution provides that military criminal
courts may be established "as federal courts" under the Minister of
Justice with general criminal jurisdiction over servicemen in situations
involving defense of servicemen abroad or on warships. 2 The Parlia-
ment has provided that such courts (Wehrgerichte) may be established
in time of war or national emergency, and the Government has con-
tingency plans for the establishment of military courts with civilian
judges under the control of the Minister of Justice.03 There are ap-
proximately 400 civilian judges, lawyers, and non-lawyers who would
become military judges under such circumstances. They are specially
62. BAsc LAw, supra note 50, art. 96a(2).
63. See Krueger-Sprengel, supra note 60. at 24.
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trained for the assignment, attend a one-week course biennially, and
have continuing contact with military personnel in the command to
which they would be attached. Such courts would have three judges,
one a lawyer. The accused would have a right to appeal to special mili-
tary courts of appeal composed of five judges, three of whom would be
lawyers. The structure of these special federal, military courts-with
civilian judges, under the control of the Ministry of Justice rather than
the Ministry of Defense-suggests the reluctance of West Germany,
even in time of war or national emergency, to return to the court-
martial system.
E. Assessment
The West German abolition of courts-martial and establishment' of
limited commanders' punishments appealable to civilian courts seem
to have worked well. 4 But because of West Germany's relative com-
pactness and the absence of troops abroad, the administrative success
of the present system cannot indicate whether the West German system
would work with other armed forces. The fact that West Germany has
provided, in time of war or emergency, for military courts, albeit ones
more civilianized than Anglo-American courts-martial, indicates some
nagging doubts as to the adaptability of their new system.
It is rather difficult to assess the impact of the military justice re-
forms on discipline, morale, and efficiency of the West German armed
forces as those revisions were only a small part of a far broader program
to remake the German military along democratic lines.0 5 Yet reform
64. This result is due in no small part to careful planning. The legal division of
the Ministry of Defense established a program of continuing education in military law
and military matters for civilian judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. Six lawyers from the
Ministry serve as liaison with civilian legal personnel, and some thirty lawyers are in-
volved in the administration of military justice and discipline. Law teachers instruct
officers and noncommissioned officers in military law, and service judges are given
special training in military law. Care was taken to locate service courts near major military
installations to reduce travel time of service personnel.
65. The new Bundeswehr has been criticized by both the left and right. The left's
position has been that the Bundeswehr is a carbon copy of the old Wehrnacht and
that the democratization reforms have not curbed militaristic tendencies. In 1964, the
Parliamentary Commissioner claimed that soldiers' rights were being neglected and
that the Bundeswehr was returning to Prussian militarism. N.Y. Times, June 16, 1964,
at 2, col. 7. In 1967, Karl Jaspers criticized the Bundeswelhr as becoming an "indirect
type of military dictatorship." K. JASPERS, THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 49 (1967). On the
right, in 1969, the Vice Inspector of the West German Army charged that undue control
by the civilian bureaucracy and the institution of Parliamentary Commissioner were
undercutting command authority. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1969, at 2, col. 4. In late 1969,
a memorandum from Army Chief of Staff, General Schnez, urged Parliamentary modifi-
cation of the provisions of the Constitution and laws which had restructured the
Bundeswehr. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1970, at 8, col. 1. Other lower-ranking officers re-
sponded in support of the democratic reforms, and in May, 1970, the White Paper, supra
note 51, issued by the Minister of Defense reiterated the Government's support for tile
reforms, contending that Germany's role in the defense of the West could best be met
with a basically anti-militaristic military.
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of military justice has not been a particularly criticized aspect of that
generally controversial program; 66 and despite some problems, the
Bundeswehr has a good record as a disciplined and efficient armed
force. 7 And while West Germany has not had the United States' prob-
lems of an unpopular war, far-flung troops, or racial unrest, it has had
to overcome the unwillingness of German young men to enter the mili-
tary,68 and yet has been able to develop a relatively stable group of
career NCO's and officers. Thus, the West German experience at least
suggests that in peacetime, order and discipline can be maintained
without courts-martial through the relatively minor disciplinary pow-
ers of commanders subject to limited civilian review.
IV. Swedish Reforms Through Abolition of Courts-Martial
and Disciplinary Powers
In 1949 Sweden abolished its court-martial system; military offenses
previously found in the court-martial code were added to the civilian
criminal code, but made applicable only to servicemen. 9 Thus, service-
men are subject to prosecution in the civilian courts for both civilian
and military offenses.70
66. But see charge by Major George Pemler, candidate for Parliament of the right-
wing National Democratic Party, that making troops subject to civilian courts for dis-
cipline had undermined the efficiency of the military. N.Y. Times, April 11, 1969, at
12, col. 1.
67. In NATO comparative evaluations, the West German forces have consistently
scored high in competition with the United States and other NATO nations in such
diverse areas as infantry, tank gunnery, paratroopers, air defense, destroyers, and missiles.
FEDERAL  fINISTRY OF DEFENSE, WHITE PAPER, supra note 51, at 43. There seem to be
no serious morale or disciplinary problems. In 1969, 65,000 West German troops par-
ticipated in "Operation Knight's Move," and a reporter found that the "most impres-
sive elements were the easy cooperation between the United States, French, and Belgian
units and the Germans ...and the high elan among the young German troops:' N.Y.
Times, Sept. 13, 1969, at 7, col. 1.
68. When the Bundesnwehr was reconstituted in 1956, only five percent of German
young men polled indicated a desire to enter the military. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1956,
at 10, col. 1. There have been over 65,000 applications for conscientious objector status
from 1956 to 1970, eighty percent of them granted. There has been a rise in CO ap-
plications since 1967 with almost 20,000 in 1970. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEERNsE, WnrrE
PAPER, supra note 51, at 83-84; A. GROSsER, GE_.Ny IN OuR TIME: A POLTICAL His-
TORY OF THE PoSv AR YEARS 225 (1971).
69. MINISTRY OF JUsTIcE, 9 THm PENAL CODE OF SWEnENq ch. 21 (T. Sellin transl. 195)
[hereinafter cited as THE PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN].
70. In describing the Swedish system of disposition of charp-es against servicemen,
the author relies in part on observation of four trials of servicemen for disciplinary
offenses in a civilian court in Stockholm in August 1971; on interviets in August 1971
with Radman Bre, Stockholm Tingsrdtt, a civilian judge whose court has jurisdiction
over military offenses, Radman Ingvar Agren, a civilian judge who is "auditor" for
three Air Force Flotillas in the Stockholm area, Hans Gbran Franck, an attorney w ho
has been engaged in cases involving members of the military, and attorne)s in the
military section of the office of the Swedish Ombudsman; and on an unpublished re-
port issued by the Ombudsman's office, Survey of Swedish Military Penal Law and
Judicial Procedire, April 20, 1971.
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A. Correction and Disciplinary Punishment
While a few serious offenses, such as abandoning a post during com-
bat must be prosecuted in the civilian courts,7 ' minor military offenses,
such as intoxication or disorderly conduct, are subject to minor "cor-
rection" and "disciplinary punishment" imposed by the commander.72
Intermediate military offenses, such as absence without leave or de-
sertion, can either be prosecuted in the civilian courts or handled by
the commander with minor punishments.7 A company commander
can only impose "correction": a warning, reprimand, extra duties for
seven days, and denial of leave for seven days. A regimental commander
or a commander of a separate unit, post, camp, or station can impose
correction and "disciplinary punishment" consisting of a limited fine
and/or denial of leave for eight to fifteen days. A fine usually of $1.50
per day is widely used by Swedish commanders in disciplinary punish-
ment.74
The commander imposes correction or disciplinary punishment by
informing the serviceman of the charges and asking him if he admits
his guilt. Another enlisted man (a "comrade-conscript") may be pres-
ent as a witness, and a record of the hearing must be made. The com-
mander may proceed with the punishment only if the serviceman ad-
mits his guilt. If the serviceman is given a disciplinary punishment,
the unit's "auditor," a civilian lawyer, reviews the legality of both the
judgment and the sentence. The commander is not bound to accept
the auditor's recommendation; but, in fact, it is invariably followed.
If the auditor agrees with the commander, the serviceman can then
appeal the disciplinary punishment to the civilian court. A punishment
of correction, following admission of guilt, can only be appealed to a
higher military authority.
If the serviceman denies his guilt, the commander can only obtain
the auditor's recommendation and forward the charges to the local
civilian court designated to hear disciplinary cases of servicemen. The
judges of these courts usually have military service experience and
some expertise in military law. The court consists of a judge and five
citizen "assistants" who are much like a jury and are selected from a
71. THE PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN, supra note 69, at ch. 21, §§ 3, 18. Career military
men may also be given sentences involving dismissal or suspension.
72. Id. at §§ 9, 15, 16.
73. Id. at §§ 11, 12, 14.
74. A 1972 act of Parliament, effective July 1, 1973, abolished confinement as a
disciplinary punishment. The new act is consistent with the prevailing philosophy In
Sweden which opposes use of confinement as a penal sanction in most cases. Sea Marnell,
Comparative Correctional Systems: United States and Sweden, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 748, 753
(1972).
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larger group chosen by the councilmen of each area. Each of the six
court members has a vote, but it takes at least four citizen assistants to
overrule the vote of the judge. As in civilian courts the procedure is
informal and investigatorial, with counsel playing a rather subordinate
role. The defendant may be represented by his own civilian attorney,
or by an attorney appointed through the state legal aid system. In dis-
ciplinary cases, which often involve only fact determinations, service-
men seldom have attorneys; but in prosecutions for civilian or non-
disciplinary military offenses, they will generally be represented by
counsel.
B. Special Military Courts in Time of War
or National Emergency
As in West Germany, there are provisions for the creation of Swedish
military courts to try servicemen in the case of war or national emer-
gency.7t A number of judges, many of them presently civilian judges
who hear military cases, would be given a military rank and would be
assigned to special military courts which would follow civilian court
procedures. These judges would be aided by three "assistants," two
civilians and one member of the military; a military attorney would
serve as prosecutor. When troops were abroad, a military court with all
military assistants could be convened to try servicemen, although the
present practice of returning servicemen from abroad for trial in Swe-
den would be continued if the military situation permitted.
C. Assessment
As in West Germany, the Swedish abolition of courts-martial seems to
have worked well. Civilian judges in whose courts servicemen are tried
receive special training in military law, and the other civilian court
personnel seem to have had no particular difficulty in understanding
and applying the substantive law of military offenses. Though Sweden
has had troops stationed in United Nations peace-keeping operations
in Cyprus, the Middle East, and the Congo, it has had no serious dif-
ficulty in returning servicemen accused of crimes to Sweden for trial
in a civilian court.7 0
75. See Lindeblad, Swedish Military Jurisdiction, 19 MiLr L. REv. 123, 126 (1953).
Chapter 22 of THE PENAL CODE OF SwrEDN, supra note 69, contains "Articles of War"
which are only applicable in time of war or grave national emergency.
76. Several years ago the commander of the Swedish troops assigned to the U.N.
peace-keeping forces in Cyprus expressed concern over the absence of military justice
powers abroad. A Swedish investigator determined that the problem vs not serious,
but suggested that a civilian judge, district attorney, and, if necessary, defense counsel,
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It is again difficult, as it was in the case of West Germany, to assess
the impact of Swedish military justice reforms on efficiency or discipline
since the abolition of courts-martial was only one of the liberal re.
forms7" which have made the Swedish armed forces one of the least
traditional militaries in the world today. The Swedish armed forces
are, however, generally conceded to be well-disciplined, though they
have experienced some of the same problems of lack of interest in mili-
tary service and boredom which have beset other western forces in
recent years.78 Again, it must be conceded that the Swedish armed forces
have not had to face the problems of either internal racial tensions or
the global deployment of troops. Thus, although the Swedish experi-
ence shows no serious administrative or disciplinary problems with
abolition of courts-martial, even when troops are abroad, its experience
may not be fully translatable to the American situation.
V. Applying the European Experience to American Military Justice
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the British, German,
and Swedish reforms. First, and most importantly, performance of key
court-martial functions by civilians (Great Britain) and trial of service-
men in civilian courts (West Germany and Sweden) do not appear to
have adversely affected military discipline or efficiency, at least so long
as commanders retained minor disciplinary powers. Second, given mod-
ern transportation and proper education of key personnel, the reforms
have not caused insurmountable administrative problems in domestic
trials. Similarly, no insurmountable administrative problems have
arisen in the prosecution of servicemen for offenses committed abroad,
although the experience does not indicate whether such problems could
be overcome if large numbers of troops were stationed abroad in time
of war or in highly unstable or inaccessible locations. West Germany
and Sweden have anticipated such problems by providing for the estab-
lishment of special military courts in time of declared war or national
emergency, but they have not yet had occasion to invoke these excep-
be flown to Cyprus periodically from Sweden to hear cases and thus avoid sending men
back to Sweden for trial. This suggestion, however, was not adopted. Interview with
Radman Bore, Aug. 2 & 3, 1971 (Stockholm). By contrast, appeals from correction or
disciplinary punishment abroad are normally handled by forwarding the papers to a ci-
vilian court for determination rather than returning the serviceman to Sweden.
77. For example, Sweden has a civilian onbudsman with authority to inspect mill-
tary units and investigate servicemen's complaints, requires commanders to consult with
a board consisting of enlisted men, NCO's, and officers, and places virtually no restric-
tions upon the length of servicemen's hair.
78. The number of applications for conscientious objector status (requiring alterna-
tive civilian service) has increased in the last five years. In 1970, there were over 3,000
applications out of 50,000 men drafted of which about twenty-five percent were granted.
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tions. However, it appears that these exceptions are only intended to
refer to a World War II-type situation involving substantial mobiliza-
tion and dislocation or to a prolonged national emergency which in-
terferes with normal operations, transportation, and functioning of
civilian courts. Finally, the experience of these countries suggests gen-
eral approval of the reforms by both servicemen and commanders
along with a generally favorable impact on the quality of military
justice.
The degree to which the experience of one nation can be applied
to another is, of course, open to question.70 However, there are strong
affinities between the armed forces of Great Britain, West Germany,
Sweden and the United States which suggest that their military justice
experiences may be relevant to one another. All four are among the
world's most modem and advanced armed forces.80 In terms of man-
power, the United States armed forces are first, the West German,
fourth, and the British, sixth.8 1 Sweden, although not in the top ten,
nevertheless also maintains a sizable trained reserve force.8 - The size
of the armed forces of all four nations has fluctuated considerably
since World War II in response to international crises, national com-
mitments, and changes in Cold War attitudes.s 3 They have a similar
internal structure, developed from a common western military tradi-
tion. Finally, all four have undergone similar liberalizing changes con-
cerning the treatment of military personnel.
Of course, the American military has tended to view our armed
forces as unique because of its primary role in the western alliance:
It is argued that given its responsibilities, the American military can-
not afford civilianizing reforms. However, as the Cold War and Viet-
nam become less dominant in American military thinking, and as we
move toward an all-volunteer army, the parallels between the United
States' and other western armed forces are becoming more apparent.
79. Toynbee has noted the interaction and increasing convergence of western cul.
tures since the end of World War II. See A. ToYNnEg, rIfE PREsE.r.-DA " E.XRI.MT
IN ESTEERN CIVILI7ATION (1962); A. TOYNBEE, AmE ICA AND TIe WORLD REVOLTIO. (1962).
80. In A ranking of non-Communist countries according to expenditurcs for military
research and development, the United States is first, Great Britain, third. West Ger-
many, fourth, and Sweden, fifth. INTERNATIONAL INsrrTTTE FoR PEACE AND CONTzaCr RE-
SEARCH, SIPRI YE.RBOOK OF WORLD ARMA.IMENTS AND DISAP.MAENTS-1972. at 82, 86.
81. UNITED STATES ARms CONTROL AND DSAmAENu T AGENcY, WORLD MIUTA'ty Ex-
PENDrrURES 1971, at 51 (1972).
82. Sweden has over one million trained reservists, out of a population of about
eight million. T. Dueuy, THE ALMANAC OF WORLD MILITARY POwER (1970). See also
Romaneski, Sweden and Nordic Balance, I PARA.MtETERS 59, 62 (1971) (the mobilized
strength of the Swedish army is 750,000).
83. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE OASD (CoMPTROLLER), SELECTED 'MANPOWIER STA-
Tiscs (April 15, 1971) with INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, TIlE mILITARY
BALANCE (1963 through 1972); WORLD ALMANAC AND Book OF FACTS FOR 19-54; "WO.RLD
ALMANAC AND Boor OF FACTS FOR 1957.
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The European experience suggests that reducing or eliminating mili-
tary control over such an armed force is feasible if an administrative
structure can be devised which does not conflict with American con-
stitutional and jurisdictional requirements.
A. The British Model
Under the British model the American armed forces would con-
tinue to maintain a separate court-martial system, with civilian judges
appointed by the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, or some
special civilian agency.84 Prosecutors would continue to be military
JAG officers under a chain of command separate from that of the com-
mander8 5 Defense counsel would be a civilian attorney hired by the
serviceman or appointed and paid for by the government.80 Alterna-
tively, a separate defense agency might be established, under the Attor-
ney General or Secretary of Defense. 7
For offenses committed overseas servicemen could either be tried
there or returned to the United States. Civilian military judges would
be assigned to live at or near American bases abroad; defense attorneys
would be American lawyers living abroad or flown in for the trial.88
84. American military judges are not considered to be exercising the judiciary power
under Article III of the Constitution. Military courts were traditionally viewed as
agencies of the executive branch pursuant to Articles I and II. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115
U.S. 487 (1885); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857). Even the civilian Court
of Military Appeals is an Article I legislative court because its judges lack lifetime tcnure
and independence in pay, assignments, ctc. Cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
Civilian court-martial judges under a non-military agency could be given life tenure
and other requisite elements of independence to become Article III judges. See pro-
posal for Article III status for judges of the Court of Military Appeals, in Comment,
The Military Judicial System: Should It Be Brought Under Article III?, 2 LAwi & Soc.
ORDER 329 (1972).
85. The Bayh, Bennett, and Hatfield Bills would establish an independent court-
martial command to exercise most of the appointive and administrative functions pres.
ently performed by the commander and his subordinates, Sherman, Congressional Pro-
posals, supra note 8, at 42-44. Two differences from the British model are that the chain
of command is to the judge Advocate General rather than an independent civilian official,
and defense counsel are also included within this military legal section.
86. It has always been considered appropriate for the military to provide counsel
free of charge to servicemen in courts-martial. Pay increases since 1970 may make many
enlisted men, for the first time, able to afford to hire a lawyer. However, the require-
ment of indigency in order to qualify for free representation might be unduly strict
for servicemen, especially in cases involving only disciplinary offenses.
87. The British experience seems to indicate that a separate military or governmental
defense agency is not necessary if there is a legal aid scheme to permit private at-
torneys to be paid by the government when the serviceman cannot afford to do so.
The 1970 amendments to the Federal Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act establish a
comprehensive structure for indigent leal assistance in federal court criminal prose-
cutions through reimbursement of appointed attorneys or reliance on Federal Public
Defender or Community Defender Organizations. 18 U.S.C. § 3006a (1970). The District
of Columbia and Chicago federal court defender programs have become models for
other federal courts. See MacCarthy, The Chicago Federal Defender Program, 8 AMs.
CRss. L.Q. 156 (1970).
88. It is usually impossible for American attorneys to represent clients in court-
martial cases abroad if military cooperation and possibly financial support are not
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B. The West German and Swedish Model
Under the West German and Swedish model, the court-martial sys-
tem established by the UCMfJ would be abolished, except in times of
declared war or national emergency.8 9 The UCMJ offenses would be
added to the federal criminal code, but made applicable only to service-
men.90 Thus servicemen would be subject to trial for both civilian and
military offenses in the regular federal district courts.0 ' Prosecutions
would be conducted by the U.S. Attorney's office, and defense counsel
would be a civilian attorney hired by the defendant or appointed by
the court. 2 When a serviceman demands a jury trial, the members
would be selected from residents of the district, both military and
civilian, according to the usual selection procedures of the Federal Jury
Selection Act.93 Thus, the panels would include members of the mili-
tary, both officers and enlisted men, as well as their adult dependents
and other civilians living in the area.
Commanding officers would retain the disciplinary punishment pow-
ers they now have under Article 15 of the UCMJ.04 A serviceman
provided. The Lawyers Military Defense Committee, only after filing suit, received
permission for its lawyers to use military transportation, telephones, and other services
necessary for representation of clients in Vietnam. TmE, Feb. 8, 1971, at 48.
89. The rules of martial law determine when military courts can be substituted for
civilian courts, and provide a workable standard for indicating when there are such
exigent conditions as to require special military courts to be convened to try servicemen.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 US. 304 (1946); Ex parte Milligan. 71 US. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866). See also R. RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAw FAins: MARTIAL LAW AND ITS
LEGAL BASIS IN THE UNITED STATES 200 (1939).
90. Reliance on a federal criminal code, rather than state laws, would seem to be
more satisfactory for servicemen's offenses and would be consistent with recent de-
velopments in federal criminal law. The proposed Federal Criminal Code would
establish a comprehensive statute containing most of the criminal offenses normally
found in state penal law, applicable to all citizens when there are grounds for federal
jurisdiction and the federal interest is sufficiently strong; to offenses committed on
federal enclaves; and to offenses committed by American citizens abroad for which
there are adequate grounds for federal jurisdiction. See NATIONAL CMMLssION .% RE-
FORM OF FEnERAL CRIMINAL LAws, STUIY DRAFT OF A NEW CRIMINAL CODE § 208(0 (1970).
91. For ease of administration, a district court might establish a special division,
staffed with a separate federal judge or with rotating federal judges from the district,
which would have jurisdiction over all military cases arising within the district. For
minor and disciplinary offenses, federal magistrates rather than judges might be used.just as they are now used to try servicemen and civilians for traffic offenses and other
misdemeanors on military installations and federal enclaves. 28 U.S.C. § 631 el seq.
(1970); 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1970). See Franks, Prosecution in Civil Courts of Minor Of-
fenses Committed on Military Installations, 51 MIL. L. REv. 85 (1971).
92. See notes 86 & 87 supra.
93. Each district court must devise a plan using voter registration lists or other ap-
proved sources. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(3) (1970). The present exemption of members
of the armed forces from federal jury service in 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1972), would have
to be removed. In addition, it might be desirable to lower the present age requirement
of twenty-one for federal jurors as a number of states have already done. On June 30,
1969, 904,000 out of 3,421,000 servicemen on active duty were under twenty-one. D'rr
OF DEFENsE, DIRECTORATE FOR INFO RMATION OPERATIONS SELECrED MtNPOvER STATISTIcs
31 (1970).
94. See note 6 supra. Following the recommendations of a special Task Force on the
Administration of Military Justice in the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense, in a
letter dated January 11, 1973, ordered military departments to revise Article 15 pro-
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offered such punishment could, however, refuse it and demand trial
in the federal court.08 Following the West German model, he could be
given a right to appeal to a federal court from severe nonjudicial pun-
ishments.
There are three feasible structures for trials resulting from crimes
committed abroad where there is no court-martial system. First, courts-
martial for overseas offenses could be retained.90 However, such a split
jurisdiction would mean that a serviceman tried abroad in a court-
martial would not be accorded the due process rights given a "domes-
tic" serviceman tried for the same offense in an American civilian
court.9
7
Second, adopting the Swedish model, servicemen could be returned
to the United States for trial in a federal court. 8 However, transport-
ing all accused servicemen and necessary witnesses back to America
(even assuming foreign witnesses could be brought to the United
States) 0 would entail considerable expense. Moreover, a jury chosen
cedures to make legal advice available to an accused prior to punishment, to give him
an opportunity to call witnesses, present evidence, and be represented at the hearing
before the commander, to advise him of the right to appeal to the next highest com-
mander, and to make the proceedings open to the public unless otherwise requested by
the accused, or if military exigencies or security precludes public disclosure. Task
Force Implementation, 3 ARMY LAWYER 7 (1973).
95. Presently, except in the case of a person attached to or embarked in a vessel,
nonjudicial punishment may not be imposed if a serviceman demands trial by court-
martial, and trial by summary court-martial may also be refused, permitting trial
only by special or general court-martial. Art. 20, UCMJ; MCM, supra note 6, para.
132, at 26-28.
96. The fact that American civilians are subject to state and federal criminal laws
while in the United States, but not while abroad due to the absence of extraterri-
torial application of most offenses, might be considered to be analogous to this split-
jurisdiction proposal.
97. There is something troubling about the fact that a serviceman who commits an
offense in Hawaii or Maine would be entitled to a federal court trial, but would be
subjected to a court-martial trial if he committed the same offense in Okinawa or in
Iceland. The United States would be subjecting the serviceman to its criminal juris-
diction based on his status as a member of the military, but would be according hin
entirely different trials depending upon his geographic location. Unlike the case of two
different state court trials where the Fourteenth Amendment would at least impose the
same basic due process standards, such basic constitutional rights as right to grandjury, trial by jury, and trial before an independent legal forum would be lacking in
the court-martial abroad.
98. Presently, federal penal statutes may apply extraterritorially to American citi-
zens for offenses committed on the high seas or in foreign countries if that is found
to be the intent of Congress. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). Cf. Blackmer
v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1931). See also Bilder, Control of Criminal Conduct in Ant-
arctica, 52 VA. L. REv. 231 (1966). See generally Harvard Research in International Latu,
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L LAW, Sum',. 437 (1935).
Venue for the trial of a serviceman for an offense committed abroad could be the
federal court district for the first location at which lie is returned to the United
States, as is presently provided under the U.S. Code for crimes committed abroad, 28
U.S.C. § 3238 (1970). An alternative would be to provide that specified United States
district courts would exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed In certain areas.
99. The United States would have no power to compel a foreign citizen to go to the
United States to serve as a witness, although he might be persuaded to do so volun-
tarily or his deposition might be taken abroad. See Joint Hearings, supra note 45, at
63, 145.
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for a federal court would be totally removed from the conditions
abroad under which the offense was committed, raising questions as
to whether the serviceman has been accorded a trial by a jury of peers.'00
The third, and most attractive, solution is trial of American service-
men abroad by U.S. district courts. There appears to be no constitu-
tional bar to the creation of such district courts in a foreign country
to exercise jurisdiction over American servicemen.10' A federal judge
and/or magistrate could either reside in the foreign country or fly to
it from a nearby American possession, or even the United States, in
order to hear trials.102 Perhaps the best structure would be the estab-
lishment of divisions of certain existing district courts. For example,
the District Court for Hawaii might establish divisions in Korea, Japan,
and Okinawa; the District Court for Guam in Taiwan and the Philip-
pines; the District Court for Massachusetts in Great Britain. 0 3 As
American troop concentrations in foreign countries fluctuate, such
divisions could be expanded, contracted, or eliminated without affect-
ing the integrity of the district courts to which they are attached. An
appropriate amendment to the Status of Forces Agreements, which now
authorizes American courts-martial in foreign countries,104 would be
100. Although the constitutional right to trial by jury does not guarantee jur'men
with similar experiences, it is troubling that a serviceman charged with an offense
committed abroad or in a combat zone might be tried thousands of miles from the
location of his offense by civilians who are not familiar with the conditions where
he committed the offense.
Servicemen have objected to trial in the relatively closed atmosphere of an overseas
court-martial, shut off from publie exposure and civilian attorneys. See comments of
Pvt. Billy Dean Smith that his acquittal in a court-martial in the United States for
alleged "fragging" in Vietnam would have been impossible if held in Vietnam. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 15, 1972, at 12, col. 3; Chenoweth v. Van Arsdale, 22 U.S.C.MA.. 183, 46
C.M.R. 183 (1973) (unsuccessful attempt by sailor charged with sabotage of ship in San
Francisco to prevent court-martial from being held in the Philippines where the ship
was subsequently dispatched).
101. There are presently four U.S. district courts sitting abroad, in Puerto Rico,
Guam, the Canal Zone, and the Virgin Islands, all located on territory over which the
United States exercises commonwealth, territorial, or other sovereign jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court has upheld congressional power to establish consular courts in foreign
countries with jurisdiction over offenses committed there by American citizens. In re
Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891). Cf. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929). But see
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1957). The last American consular court was abolished in
1956. See R. STANGER, IN-RMNATIONZL LAW STYDIEs 1957-1958: CRIMINAL JurMICTrION ovER
VIsmN ARmED FoRcEs 18-23 (1965).
102. If the judge did not live within the district. § 28 U.S.C. § 134(b) (1970), requiring
that all judges, except in the District of Columbia, live within their district, would
have to be amended.
103. The District Court for the District of Columbia exercises habeas corpus juris-
diction over servicemen abroad. Day v. Wilson, 247 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Cozart v.
Wilson, 236 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir.
1949), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 338 U.S. 877 (1949).
104. See Agreement Among the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S. 1792, T.I,.S. No. 2846; Note, Criminal
Jurisdiction over American Armed Forces Abroad, 70 H, v. L. Ray. 1043 (1957) (dis-
cussing SOFA agreements with forty-nine nations). These agreements typically provide
for concurrent jurisdiction over criminal acts of servicemen abroad with the right to
exercise primary jurisdiction in the sending or the host nation depending upon the
type of offense and the circumstances under which it was committed.
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necessary to permit the United States to replace courts-martial with
divisions of the district courts. Foreign countries are not likely to find
this objectionable since a division attached to a United States district
court on American territory should not suggest any permanency nor
any invasion of the foreign country's sovereignty.105
Prosecutors in such federal trials abroad would be either the U.S.
Attorneys appointed for the court, or pursuant to the British model,
military attorneys.106 Defense counsel would again be resident private
American attorneys107 or ones flown in for the trial. If the number of
local American attorneys were so small as to deprive a serviceman of a
reasonable choice, he might be entitled to the selection or appointment
of an American attorney from elsewhere, transported at government
expense.
One of the principal objections to the establishment of such courts
abroad has been the difficulty of obtaining a representative jury. How-
ever, in any overseas location where there are enough American service.
men to produce a significant number of military justice cases, there
should be enough servicemen to provide an adequate pool. 108 More-
over, in most overseas installations, there are a sizable number of civil-
ian American citizens, such as military dependents, and private or gov-
ernment employees, who could also be included. 09 In any event, the
pool would be larger and more representative than the present all-offi-
cer (or one-third enlisted men) court-martial panels; and given the
wide divergence in age, race, economic status, and geographic origin
of servicemen, it should provide as representative a jury as most fed-
eral jury pools. In those rare cases where there are an insufficient num-
ber of American servicemen and civilians to compose an adequate pool,
a serviceman could be transported elsewhere for trial.
One problem with courts abroad is the limitation on a judge's au-
105. See Ehrenhaft, Policing Civilians Accompanying the United States Armed Forces
Overseas: Can United States Commissioners Fill the Jurisdictional Gap?, 36 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 273, 287 (1967). But see Joint Hearings, supra note 45, at 334.
106. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970), which forbids use of "any
part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute tile
laws" without express authorization by the Constitution or Act of Congress would pre-
vent use of military prosecutors.
107. A surprising number of civilian American attorneys reside abroad near American
military installations, some of them retired JAG officers, some associated with firms In
the United States, and, in the last few years, some working for religious, civil liberties,
or anti-war organizations which have established legal offices to assist servicemen. It
is also possible that foreign attorneys could represent servicemen in federal courts abroad.
The U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone, for example, will admit to practice a foreign
attorney if he meets certain residency and educational requirements. CANAL ZONE CoDE
t. 3, § 541 (1963).
108. But see note 93 supra.
109. For statistics showing the number of servicemen and dependents at various over-
seas installations, see U.S. Military Personnel in Asia, By Country: 1950 to 1971, U.S.
BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1972, at 260 (93d cd.).
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thority to subpoena foreign witnesses and evidence, and issue other
forms of mandatory process on foreign citizens. To enforce such orders
courts could only exert such authority with the assistance of de foreign
government."10 As under the present court-martial system, the United
States would have to utilize the offices of the foreign government in
obtaining compulsory process over their citizens. As under the present
court-martial system,'11 critical defense witnesses in the United States
could be ordered to be returned to the foreign installation if still in the
military; or if civilians, their deposition could be taken and introduced
into evidence if they would not voluntarily return for the trial."2
Deposition and other discovery procedures would actually be simpler
than under the court-martial system, since the practice would be uni-
form with all federal courts, and other federal courts could assist the
court abroad."13 In the unusual case where many of the important wit-
nesses are in the United States, the overseas federal court judge could
determine that a change of venue to the United States would be
proper." 4
A useful by-product of establishing overseas federal courts would be
their possible applicability to overseas offenses by American civilians.
The Supreme Court's decisions in the 1950's striking down provisions
of the UCMJ which subjected civilian dependents and employees of
the military abroad to court-martial jurisdiction left such civilians gen-
erally unprosecutable for crimes committed overseas.115 Numerous
110. Assistance by the host country in the apprehension and trial of offenders of a
visiting nation's armed forces is often provided. See, e.g., Air Force Regulation 110-17,
May 8, 1967, permitting friendly foreign military forces stationed in the United States
to use American military forces in apprehension and confinement of offending foreign
servicemen.
In Okinawa, American commanders must request the issuance of a warrant from ajudge of the Okinawan Civil Administration or Magistrate Court in order to searcl
off-post dwellings of American servicemen. United States v. Mitchell, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 340,
45 C.M.R. 114 (1972).
111. See arts. 46 & 49, UCMJ; United States v. Hodge, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 412, 43 C.M.R.
252 (1971).
112. See FED. R. CuM. P. 15(e).
113. The assistance which federal courts give to other federal courts concerning
service of process, disposition of contempt orders, and the like, is a practical convenience
which courts-martial lack. Also, unlike courts-martial, which may have a jurisdictional
barrier to imposing compulsory process over civilians, federal courts would have no
difficulty in compelling civilians to testify. However, a federal court sitting abroad
would probably have to utilize some military facilities and services. Military policemen
might be used to conduct investigations, make arrests, serve process, and insure order
in the court-room. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 105, at 302.
114. See FED. R. CraM. P. 21(b).
115. American civilians abroad may be tried by the foreign country, but the host
nation frequently refuses to prosecute for minor crimes such as traffic offenses and
for offenses involving only Americans or American property. Foreign courts have some-
times given unduly light sentences to American civilians for serious crimes not affecting
that country or its citizens. One wife who killed her American serviceman husband in
Germany was given only thirty-two days' confinement by a German court. Joint Hearings,
supra note 45, at 67.
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proposals have been made to plug this loophole, 10 but Congress has
not yet acted. The establishment of overseas courts to try servicemen
could solve this problem by providing a judicial structure which would
provide a jury and other due process rights sufficient to pass constitu-
tional muster for the trial of civilians abroad."'7
VI. Conclusion
The American court-martial, with its command-dominated struc-
ture," 8 all military personnel,"19 commander-selected jury primarily
from the officer class,' 20 inadequate pre-trial procedures,'21 and limited
appeals, 122 provides servicemen with an inferior form of criminal jus-
116. See Everett & Hourcle, Crime Without Punishment-ExServicemen, Civilian
Employees and Dependents, 13 JAG L. REV. 184 (1971); Ehrenhaft, supra note 105.
117. Cost is one drawback to proposals for establishing a federal court structure III
foreign countries for the relatively 'small number of offenses committed by civilians
abroad. The number of criminal offenses, both military and civilian, committed by
servicemen abroad is more substantial, warranting the expense. There would also be
concomitant savings from the dissolution of the presently costly JAG legal establishment.
118. For accounts of the adverse impact which command control has had upon the
quality of justice in the military, see P. BARNES, PAWNS, TIlE PLIGIT OF TIlE CITIZEN-
SOLDIER 185-91 (1972); R. RIVKIN, G. I. RIGHTS AND ARMY JUSTICE: TIlE DRAFTEE'S GUIDE
TO MILITARY LIFE AND LAW 241-66 (1970); R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE As
MILITARY MUSIC is TO MusIC 40-178 (1970); West, Command Influence, in CONSCIENCE
AND COMMAND 73 (J. Finn ed. 1971); Fuchsberg, Command Influence on Military justice,
7 TRIAL 36 (1971); Rothblatt, Military Justice or Injustice: The Green Beret Case, 75
CASE & CoM. 3 (1970). But see De Giulio, Command Control: Lawful Versus Unlawful
Application, 10 SAN DIEcO L. REV. 72 (1972); Hodson, Courts-Martial and the Commander,
10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 51 (1972).
119. Military defense attorneys may be subjected to pressures, both direct and subtle,
by the command or by the fact of their military status. See, e.g., F. GARDNER, TIlE UN-
LAWFUL CONCERT, AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRESIDIO MUTINY CASE 99, 143 (1970); Benson,
Military Justice in the Consumer Perspective, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 595, 601-06 (1971)- Fair-
banks, Disciplinary Discharges-Restricting the Commander's Discretion, 22 HASTINGS L.J.
291, 305 (1971). But see De Giulio, Comnmand Control, supra note 118; Moyer, Pro-
cedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages Over a Civilian Defendant, 22
MAINE L. REV. 105, 133-38 (1970).
120. For analysis of the deficiencies in court-martial selection procedures, see Larkln,
Should the Military Less-Than-Unanimous Verdict of Guilt Be Retained?, 22 HASTINGS
L.J. 237 (1971). Remcho, supra note 43; Van Loan, The Jury, tile Court-Martial, and
the Constitution, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 363 (1972); Comment, Stacked Juries: A Problem
of Military Injustice, 11 SANTA CLARA LAWYEt 362 (1971). But see Everett, Military
Justice Is To Justice As, 12 A.F. JAG L. REV. 202 (1970); Hodson, supra note 118, at 60-65.
121. For discussion of deficiencies and discrimination in court-martial pre-trial pro-
cedures, see NAACP SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION FUND, TIE SEARCit FOR MILITARY JUSTICE:
REPORT OF AN NAACP INQUIRY INTO THE PROBLEMS OF TilE NEGRO SERVICEMEN IN 1VESt'
GERMANY 8-12 (1971); Bayh, Tile Military Justice Act of 1971: The Need for Legislative
Reform, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 17-19; Report of tle DOD Task Force on tho Ad-
ministration of Military Justice in tie Armed Forces, 1 MILITARY L. DIG. 1 (1972);
Sherman, supra note 1, at 85-87. But see Everett, supra note 120; McCoy, Due Process
for Servicemen-The Military Justice Act of 1968, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 66 (1969).
122. For discussion of inadequacies in appellate review of court-martial convictions,
see Burris & Jones, Civilian Courts and Courts-Martial-The Civilian Attorney's Per-
spective, 10 Am. CRI5. L. REV. 139 (1971); Willis, The Constitution, tile United States
Court of Military Appeals in the Future, 57 MIL. L. REv. 27 (1972); Willis, The United
States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation and Future, 55 MIL. L. REV. 39
(1972). But see Ghent, Military Appellate Processes, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 125 (1971);
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tice. Proposed reforms of the UCMJ123 would remedy some of these
problems but would leave intact the structure of court-martial, with
its intrinsic relationship to military disciplinary policies and control.'24
Reforms along the lines of either the British or West German-Swedish
models, resulting in the separation and civilianization of military justice
functions, appear to be a feasible way to provide American servicemen
with greater justice. Adaptation of the British, or West German-Swedish
models to the American military would require considerable structural
changes, and some initial cost.I 5 However, it appears that these models
can be adapted to the American armed forces with no loss of military
effectiveness, and the improved quality of justice for the serviceman
which they portend suggests that the effort would be well worth it.
Quinn, Courts-Martial Practice: A View from the Top, 22 H amNcs I.J. 201 (1971);
Weckstein, Federal Court Review of Courts-Martial Proceedings: A Delicate Balance of
Individual Rights and Military Responsibility, 54 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1971).
123. See notes 10 & 11 supra.
124. The application of constitutional standards to courts-martial by federal courts
is a potential source for substantial restructuring of military justice as indicated by
recent federal court holdings of unconstitutionality of the military offense of "dis-
loyal statements," see Stoke & Amick v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392 (D.D.C. 1972): art. 134.
UCMJ, the "general article" forbidding "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline" and "conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces," Averch v. Secretary of the Navy, 41 U.S.L.W. 2497 (D.C. Cir. Mtarch 20, 1973);
and art. 133, UCMJ, forbidding "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." Le y
v. Parker, No. 71-1917 (3d Cir. April 18, 1973). However, the federal courts have gen-
erally rejected constitutional attacks upon structural aspects of the court-martial system.
See O'CaIlahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969) (dictum that the right to trial byjury does not apply to the military); Davies v. Clifford, 393 F.2d 496 (1st Cir. 1968) (no
right to appeal court-martial conviction to circuit courts); Gallagher v. Quinn, 363 F.2d
301 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 881 (1966) (limitation in UCMJ of automatic ap-
peal to the Court of Military Appeals to generals and flag officers, constitutional).
125. It is difficult to estimate the cost of replacing the court-martial s)stem with
federal court trials. However, the court-martial system is itself expensive to operate. In
1970, there were almost four thousand full-time JAG officers in the Anny, Na), Air
Force, and Coast Guard, a high percentage of those in the Army and Navy engaged
primarily in the administration of military justice. ANNUAL REPoRT OF T E U.S. CouRT oF
MILITARY APPEALS & THE JUDGE ADvocATEs GENERAL OF THE ARsMEn FoRcEs & rmE GEN-
ERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPaT OF TRANSPORTATION PURSUANT TO TIlE UCMJ, at 22, 27, 35
(Jan. 1, 1970 to Dec. 31, 1970). The cost of maintaing each JAG officer includes not
only base pay, but also allowances and allotments, special benefits such as medical care,
post services, and commissary and PX privileges, and considerable education expenses.
The operating budget of the United States Court of Military Appeals alone, which
does not include the full rental value of the building it occupies in Washington, D.C.
is $874,000 for 1973. Fiscal Year 1973-Department of Defense-Military, TuE BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GovERLNMNiENT ArP. 295. In many cases the military justice s)stem
duplicates the court structure and judicial personnel already existing in the local
federal court, and only a small increase in personnel would appear to be required if
military justice cases were transferred to the federal courts. However, in other cases,
particularly in relation to trial of servicemen abroad, new and expensive court struc-
tures would have to be devised and new court personnel provided.
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